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Earnings Management Using the Valuation Allowance for Deferred Tax Assets under 
SFAS 109 
 
Abstract 
 
 
SFAS 109 allows firms to use their discretion to set arbitrarily high valuation allowances against 
deferred tax assets.  Firms can then later use these "hidden reserves" to manage earnings.  Our 
evidence indicates that most banks do not record a valuation allowance to manage earnings, but 
rather to follow the guidelines of SFAS 109.  However, if the bank is sufficiently well capitalized 
to absorb the current-period impact on capital, the amount of the valuation allowance increases 
with a bank’s capital.  In later years, bank managers adjust the valuation allowance to smooth 
earnings.  The magnitude of the discretionary adjustment increases with the deviation of 
unadjusted earnings from the forecast or historical earnings.   
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate whether banks manage earnings by setting a high valuation 
allowance associated with deferred tax assets (DTAs) and adjust the valuation allowance in 
subsequent periods.  The Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 109 (SFAS 109) 
requires firms to create valuation allowances against deferred tax assets.  In later years, 
adjustments to the allowance flow through income as part of the total income tax provision.  In 
the debate over the new standard, analysts conjectured that when firms adopted SFAS 109, they 
could overestimate the valuation allowance and strategically write off the allowance to increase 
income in future years.1 
Firms could “hide” the valuation allowance when they adopted SFAS 109 because the 
cumulative adjustment before the valuation allowance generally swamped the size of the 
valuation allowance.  However, the valuation allowance was large enough to provide firms with 
the opportunity for future earnings manipulation.  The mean valuation allowance of the sample 
banks is $0.09 per share ($0.37 for sample banks that reported nonzero valuation allowances) 
relative to total reported earnings per share of $1.99 on average.  
Our analysis focuses on a sample of publicly traded bank holding companies (hereafter, 
banks).  Banks have large deferred tax assets and, consequently, the potential for substantial 
valuation allowances.  Also, banks have relatively homogeneous operating activities and 
exposure to macroeconomic conditions.  These factors strengthen our model of the 
nondiscretionary adjustments to the valuation allowance. 
Our analysis of banks’ decisions at the adoption of SFAS 109 indicates that banks do not 
record a valuation allowance just to manage earnings.  Of the 225 banks in our sample, 86 
establish a valuation allowance.  We find that banks’ decisions to establish an allowance are 
                                                 
1 For example, White et al. (1998) caution:  “Given management discretion, the valuation allowance has become 
another factor used to evaluate the quality of earnings. ... The important point is that changes in the valuation 
allowance often affect reported earnings and can be used to manage them.” (pp. 444-445; emphasis theirs).  Khalaf 
(1993) provides a quote from Robert Willens, a tax and accounting expert at Shearson Lehman Brothers, who states 
"[w]ith Statement 109, accounting rulemakers have created an incredible earnings management tool.  This reserve is 
a mass with which you can do whatever you want."   
 
  
 
2 
related to the sources of DTAs and proxies for positive or negative evidence about the future 
realizability of the DTAs.  This finding suggests that banks followed the guidelines of the 
accounting standard.  However, if a bank sets an allowance and if the bank is sufficiently well 
capitalized to absorb the current-period earnings impact of a higher valuation allowance, then the 
amount of the allowance increases with a bank’s capital.  Thus, if the expected costs of violating 
regulatory capital requirements are low, banks that establish allowances tend to over-reserve. 
After the adoption of SFAS 109, we find that banks reduce their valuation allowances 
(i.e., increase income) to offset the deviations of the banks’ unadjusted earnings from the 
consensus analyst forecast and average historical earnings per share.  When unadjusted earnings 
are below (above) the target, we observe that banks make income-increasing (decreasing) 
changes in the valuation allowance.  The amount of the change in the valuation allowance is 
significantly associated with the magnitude of the deviation from the target.  Our analysis is 
robust to controls for nondiscretionary determinants of adjustments to the valuation allowance. 
Our results indicate that banks use the valuation allowance to smooth earnings toward the 
consensus forecast and historical earnings per share.  These results are not consistent with those 
of Miller and Skinner (1998) who examine a sample of firms from multiple industries and find 
no evidence that firms use the allowance for earnings management.  The homogeneity of our 
sample firms, which strengthens our model of the nondiscretionary adjustments to the valuation 
allowance, results in more powerful tests and may explain the conflict between our results and 
those of Miller and Skinner (1998).  However, the focus on banks obviously reduces the 
generalizability of the results.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the sample selection criteria and 
provides descriptive statistics for the sample bank holding companies.  Section 3 describes the 
tests of earnings management at SFAS 109 adoption and presents the results of these tests.  
Section 4 describes the tests of earnings management subsequent to adoption and presents the 
results of these tests.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2.  Sample and descriptive statistics 
The sample is comprised of the 336 commercial banks in the 1993 Compustat Bank 
Annual file that have a December fiscal year-end.  SFAS 109 was issued in February 1992 and 
became effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992.  We collect data related to 
deferred tax assets from income tax footnotes in annual reports or Form 10-K filings.  These data 
are available for 285 of the 336 banks.  Financial statement data are from Compustat and the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Y-9 database.  Our final sample contains 235 banks with available 
hand-collected deferred tax data and non-missing Compustat data that adopted SFAS 109 in 
1993.  Nineteen of the 336 banks are money center banks (MCBs).2 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on deferred taxes for the sample of 235 banks in 
the year the bank adopted SFAS 109.  SFAS 109 proposes a balance sheet approach to the 
measurement of income taxes that replaces the income statement approach prescribed by APB 
11.  Under SFAS 109, firms are required to identify temporary differences, and operating loss 
and credit carryforwards.  Firms are also required to measure the total deferred tax liabilities 
(DTLs) for taxable temporary differences and the total deferred tax assets (DTAs) for deductible 
temporary differences and carryforwards.  Firms must reduce total DTAs by a valuation 
allowance if it is “more likely than not” that the DTAs will not be realized.  Thus, the table 
presents descriptive statistics for gross DTAs and DTLs, and the valuation allowance.  The table 
also shows the sources of DTAs, including DTAs related to deductible temporary differences, 
and operating and credit carryforwards.  
Total deferred tax assets, excluding the portion attributable to available-for-sale (AFS) 
securities, range from $100 thousand to $3.8 billion.  We exclude deferred tax assets on AFS 
securities from the definition of DTAs throughout the paper, including instances in which we use 
DTAs as scalers.  Changes in DTAs associated with these securities do not affect reported tax 
                                                 
2 We identify money center banks from various sources including http://biz.yahoo.com/p/financ-bankmc.html, 
http://www.stockselector.com, Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1999), Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997), History 
of the Eighties, Lessons for the Future (1997), and the FDIC Banking Review (1998). 
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expense or net income.  Banks separately report DTAs related to AFS securities in the tax 
footnote, when material. 
 The average valuation allowance (VA) for deferred tax assets is $11.1 million, with 
39.1% of the 235 adopters reporting a valuation allowance greater than zero.  The single largest 
component of total DTAs is the tax effect of temporary differences between the book and tax 
bases of loans created by loan loss provisions (LLP).  The related DTA is material (i.e., reported 
separately) for 97.4% of the sample banks and comprises an average of 61.3% of total DTAs.  
DTAs associated with net operating loss carryforwards (NOL) constitute 5.3% of total DTAs and 
are material for 23.4% of the sample banks.  More than 20% of the sample banks also report 
material DTAs attributable to temporary differences related to other postretirement benefits 
(OPEB), deferred compensation (DEFCOMP), real estate assets acquired in foreclosure 
(REALE), and loan origination fees (LNFEE).  However, these items generally represent smaller 
percentages of the total DTAs.  
 
{INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.} 
 
Results (not reported) show that money center banks (MCBs) are more likely to have 
valuation allowances than are non-MCBs; 60.0% report valuation allowances compared to 
37.8% for non-MCBs.  However, if the MCB does have an allowance, as a percent of total DTAs 
the average allowance is lower than that for retail banks (7.5% compared to 13.5%).  Sources of 
DTAs also differ across MCBs and non-MCBs.  MCBs are equally likely to have NOLs as a 
source of DTAs, but as a percent of DTAs, the average net operating loss carryforward is 
significantly lower for MCBs (1.4% compared to 5.6%).  MCBs, relative to retail banks, also 
have more DTAs attributable to real estate assets acquired in foreclosure (43.8%) and other 
carryforwards (18.8%).  MCBs are less likely to have DTAs generated by loan fees and, when 
reported, the amounts are significantly lower.  The average ratio of DTLs to DTAs for MCBs is 
91.9%, which is significantly higher than the average of 56.5% for non-MCBs.  This pattern 
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suggests that DTLs might serve as a justification for MCBs to record a lower valuation 
allowance.   
The differences between the components of DTAs for money center and retail banks 
suggest that our control variables for these components may not be adequate across both types of 
banks.  Thus, we conduct separate analyses for retail and money center banks. 
 
3.  Tests of earnings management at the adoption date 
The valuation allowance as an earnings management tool suggests that we can predict 
firm behavior both at the time the firm adopts SFAS 109 and after adoption.  Firms that intend to 
use the valuation allowance to smooth or increase earnings in future periods will strategically 
overestimate the valuation allowance at adoption, subject to the constraints of other earnings 
management incentives discussed below.  
Our analysis of earnings management at SFAS 109 adoption begins with a benchmark 
model that specifies the nondiscretionary factors we predict are associated with the valuation 
allowance (VA).  In the absence of earnings management, two factors determine the extent to 
which deferred tax assets require a valuation allowance.  These two factors are the sources of the 
temporary differences that create the deferred tax assets and the probability that the firm can 
realize the DTAs.   
Our benchmark model includes the components of DTAs (referred to collectively as 
COMPONENTS) and proxies for the manager's assessment that future income will be sufficient 
to utilize the deferred tax assets (FUT_REAL): 
 
 efla +++= åå
k
k
j
j REALFUTCOMPONENTSVA _  (1) 
Although the valuation allowance is a contra-asset account, we present the valuation allowance 
and increases in it as positive amounts.   
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We extend the benchmark model that controls for the nondiscretionary portion of the 
valuation allowance to include proxies for earnings management incentives (EARNMGMT): 
 
 ebfla ++++= ååå
i
i
k
k
j
j EARNMGMTREALFUTCOMPONENTSVA _  (2) 
 
A. Proxies for incentives to manage earnings 
Firms face conflicting incentives to manage the valuation allowance when they adopt 
SFAS 109.  At adoption firms can set high valuation allowances as a “hidden reserve” to use to 
manage earnings in future periods (Khalaf, 1993; Petree et al., 1995; and White et al., 1998).  
Later, the firm can write off the reserve, and the write-off will flow through income as a 
reduction to income tax expense.  At adoption overstatement of the reserve is likely to go 
unnoticed, because the nondiscretionary effect of the change in accounting princ iples from APB 
11 to SFAS 109 generally obscures the total effect of the valuation allowance.   
When a firm adopts SFAS 109, its incentive to create hidden reserves for future earnings 
management is mitigated by the immediate negative effect of the valuation allowance on bank 
regulatory capital. 3  Low regulatory capital is costly.  Banks that violate capital requirements 
incur both out-of-pocket and opportunity costs (Rose, 1996, and Moyer, 1990).  For significantly 
undercapitalized banks, regulators can require recapitalization or they can force the institutions 
into conservatorship or receivorship.  All banks that fail to meet minimum capital requirements 
must submit a comprehensive capital restoration plan to regulators, which is costly to prepare 
and implement.  In addition, during the time that a bank is undercapitalized, its regulator can 
restrict dividends and management fees.  The regulator can also exercise control over the bank’s 
operations by placing limits on branching, expansion, and new services.  Even for banks with 
capital above the minimum requirement, higher capital creates a competitive advantage.  Well-
                                                 
3 In April 1993, bank regulatory agencies proposed a new Regulatory Accounting Principle for income taxes that is 
similar to SFAS 109.  The new rule, approved in 1994, allows banks to include deferred tax assets, net of a valuation 
allowance, in the computation of regulatory capital, subject to the lesser of 10% of Tier 1 capital or the amount of 
the tax credit the bank expects to utilize during the coming year (American Banker, 1994).  
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capitalized institutions face fewer regulatory constraints on operations, enjoy more timely 
approval for expansion and growth from federal banking agencies, and pay lower FDIC 
insurance premiums. 
Although all banks have incentives to create hidden reserves, the costs of creating the 
reserve are negatively associated with a bank’s capital position.  Thus, we predict a positive 
association between a bank’s incentives to manage the valuation allowance and its capital 
adequacy.  The proxy variable for a bank’s capital adequacy is its Tier 1 capital ratio 
(TIER1CAP) (Compustat data item #337).  Tier 1 capital is the most conservative amount of 
capital that regulators can use to determine capital adequacy.  As of 1992 year end, the minimum 
required total capital ratio was 8%, of which at least 4% had to be Tier 1 capital.  In addition, 
banks were required to maintain a Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% (or higher for low-rated or high-
growth banks). 
Tier 1 capital comprises common stock, surplus, undivided profits, qualifying preferred 
stockholders’ equity, minority interest in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries, and 
selected identifiable intangible assets, less goodwill, other nonqualifying intangibles, excess 
deferred tax assets, and 50% of investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries.  Banks are allowed to 
include deferred tax assets in the computation of Tier 1 capital up to their projected annual 
income or 10% of Tier 1 capital, whichever is less (American Banker, 1993; American Banker, 
1994.  See Rose, 1996, for a detailed explanation.)  
In equation (2), we estimate separately the coefficient on capital adequacy for well- and 
poorly capitalized banks.  CAPABOVE equals the bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio less the median 
size-adjusted industry Tier1 capital ratio if this difference is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise.  CAPBELOW equals the bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio less the median size-adjusted 
industry Tier 1 capital ratio if this difference is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  After 
partitioning the sample banks into five portfolios based on total book assets, we compute the 
median size-adjusted capital ratio.  The coefficients on CAPABOVE and CAPBELOW measure 
the association between the valuation allowance and capital for relatively well- and relatively 
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poorly capitalized banks, respectively.4  For both variables, our prediction of a positive 
association between capital and the valuation allowance remains; the two variables allow for a 
non- linearity in the positive relation. 
We do not include proxies for a bank’s incentives to manage current-period earnings at 
the adoption date of SFAS 109.  We assume that, except to the extent that earnings influence 
capital, banks are not concerned about the impact of the accounting change on current-period 
earnings.  The cumulative effect of accounting changes on earnings is a below-the- line item that 
is specifically excluded from some analyst forecasts (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2000).  
 
B. Components of the valuation allowance 
Cross-sectional variation in the nondiscretionary portion of the valuation allowance can 
occur because of differences in the sources of total DTAs.  For example, banks that establish a 
valuation allowance frequently report that an allowance is necessary because otherwise, net 
operating loss carryforwards, which are a source of DTAs, will expire unused.  Thus, if there is a 
valuation allowance, its magnitude is related to the extent to which NOLs are a source of DTAs.  
More generally, the SFAS 109 criteria for recognizing a valuation allowance require that firms 
estimate the realizability of a DTA based on the timing of its reversal.  Ex ante, we expect that 
differences in the reversal periods of the sources of DTAs will lead to variation in the valuation 
allowance. 
Because of the potential differences in the relations between the specific components of 
DTAs and the valuation allowance, we include in the analysis separate variables for the sources 
of DTAs (COMPONENTS).  We disaggregate the sources of DTAs into eight categories: net 
operating loss carryforwards (NOLs), other carryforwards such as alternative minimum tax credit 
                                                 
4 An alternative specification is to partition the banks into the five capital adequacy categories that the FDIC created 
to implement the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.  However, the majority of our banks are considered “well 
capitalized” under their definitions and the remaining banks are considered “adequately” capitalized.  Hence, 
partitioning the sample based on the FDIC definitions does not provide sufficient cross-sectional dispersion and 
reduces the power of the tests. 
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carryforwards (OTHERCF), book loan loss provisions (LLP), other postretirement benefits 
(OPEB), deferred compensation (DEFCOMP), nonaccrual interest (NACCINT), real estate 
assets acquired in foreclosure (REALE), and loan origination fees (LNFEE).  We identify the 
eight components based on empirical evidence in Miller and Skinner (1998), discussions of 
significant sources of bank DTAs in Brezovec and Snow (1992) and Cocco et al. (1994), and our 
own analysis of frequently cited components, which we summarize in Table 1.5  
We expect a positive relation between the valuation allowance and the proportion of 
DTAs that result from NOLs and other carryforwards.  Net operating loss and tax credits 
carryforwards (NOLs) are a source of DTAs because a firm can offset current NOLs against 
future taxable income.  Miller and Skinner (1998) confirm that a firm’s NOLs are a major 
determinant of the valuation allowance (in both level and change regressions).  Our review of the 
sample banks’ financial statement footnotes also identifies carryforwards other than NOLs 
(OTHERCF).  These carryforwards include items such as alternative minimum tax credit 
carryforwards as a significant source of DTAs for banks.  As with NOLs, we predict a positive 
association between OTHERCF and the valuation allowance.  For the other components of 
DTAs, we do not make sign predictions about the relation with DTAs; we include the variables 
only as controls.  A positive coefficient on a component would indicate that it is difficult to 
justify realizability of the DTA, probably because the realization period is long.  A negative 
coefficient would indicate that banks could more easily justify realizability.   
 
C. Proxies for expectations about future income realizations 
Because SFAS 109 requires firms to consider all positive and negative evidence about the 
realizability of DTAs when determining the valuation allowance, a small or no valuation 
allowance is justified only if positive evidence of strong core business profitability levels and 
                                                 
5 Our sample banks also report other sources of DTAs including unrealized holding losses on investment securities 
available for sale, securities marked to market for tax purposes (IRC Section 475), asset valuation reserves, 
restructuring reserves, lease accounting differences, and others.  However, reports of these sources are idiosyncratic. 
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trends outweighs the negative evidence.  Firms can use historical earnings realizations as 
"positive" evidence that future earnings are (or are not) likely to be sufficient to realize the 
benefits of existing DTAs.  Under SFAS 109, a manager should reduce (increase) the valuation 
allowance when the manager increases (decreases) his assessment of anticipated future earnings.  
Negative evidence that would suggest a large valuation allowance includes a history of losses, an 
expectation of reporting losses in the near future, or the existence of unsettled events that could 
adversely affect the profitability of the firm on a continuing basis. 
We use two proxies to measure a firm's assessment of its future profitability.  Our first 
proxy is its historical return on average assets (HROA), which we calculate as the mean ROA for 
year's t-2, t-1, and t.  Our specification of this variable assumes that managers know, when they 
set the valuation allowance, what the ROA will be in period t.  (Although this is a reasonable 
assumption, we also calculate this variable over t-3, t-2, and t-1.  The results are robust to this 
specification.)  Because higher historical income can justify a lower valuation allowance, we 
predict a negative association between HROA and VA.   
Our second proxy for a firm's assessment of its future profitability is the bank’s realized 
return on average assets in year t+1 (ROAt+1).  Similar to the prediction for HROA, we predict a 
negative association between ROAt+1 and VA.  However, we are careful in interpreting the 
results related to this proxy.  ROAt+1 represents the ex post realization of earnings as a proxy for 
the manager's assessment of future profitability.  Thus, the prediction assumes perfect foresight.  
The prediction also assumes that the manager does not manipulate the valuation allowance 
during year t+1. 
Two additional factors that can provide positive evidence on the likelihood of DTA 
realization are the availability of DTLs to offset reversals of DTAs in future periods, and the 
availability of taxable income in carryback years (Brezovec and Snow, 1992).  Future reversals 
of temporary differences that created DTLs can offset future reversals of temporary differences 
that created DTAs.  Ceteris paribus, banks with larger amounts of deferred tax liabilities might 
more easily be able to justify a lower valuation allowance by showing that they can realize the 
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benefits of DTAs when the DTLs reverse.  Thus, we predict a negative relation between DTLs 
and the valuation allowance in equation (2).   
We do not include a proxy for the availability of taxable income in carryback years in 
equation (2) because of data availability.  Within the banking industry, the availability of DTLs 
and the availability of taxable income in carryback years are usually not as important as other 
evidence of future realizability, because the effects are too short- lived to justify the probable 
("more likely than not") realization of DTAs related to loan loss provisions and postretirement 
benefit costs (Brezovec and Snow, 1992). 
 
D. Results of adoption-date tests 
Because the data are truncated, an ordinary least squares estimation of equation (2) will 
provide inconsistent estimates of the relation between the valuation allowance and the 
explanatory variables.  In the full sample, 92 of the 235 sample-bank observations adopt a 
valuation allowance but 143 do not.  For the non-adopters, we observe only that the valuation 
allowance is zero.  We do not observe the disutility that the bank has for recording a valuation 
allowance.  To correct for this data truncation, we estimate a system of two equations by using 
two-stage least squares.  The model provides consistent estimates of the relations between the 
explanatory variables and the valuation allowance. 
The first equation is a probit model of the binary choice to report a valuation allowance.  
The dependent variable equals one if the valuation allowance is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise.  We estimate this equation with 225 observations (of the 235 described in Table 1) 
that have available data to compute the historical return on assets (HROA).  The second equation 
is a linear model in which the dependent variable equals the amount of the valuation allowance at 
the date of adoption of SFAS 109, scaled by DTAs.  We estimate the linear equation by 
including only the observations with a nonzero valuation allowance at adoption.  Of these 92 
banks, 86 have data available to compute HROA.  The independent variables in both equations 
include the components of DTAs, scaled by total DTAs.  The variables also include proxies for 
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the future realizability of DTAs and CAPABOVE and CAPBELOW as proxies for earnings 
management incentives.  Table 2 presents the results.  The table shows the marginal effects of 
the regressors for the probit model and the coefficient estimates for the linear model.  The p-
values are based on corrected standard errors.  We include the inverse mills ratio, derived from 
the probit model results, in the linear equation as a control for omitted variables related to the 
decision to establish a valuation allowance.  The coefficient estimate on this variable is not 
significantly different from zero and therefore is not presented.6   
 
{INSERT TABLE 2 HERE.} 
 
We look first at the relation between the valuation allowance and the capital variables.  
The coefficient estimates on the capital variables provide evidence about banks’ use of the 
valuation allowance for earnings management.  We predict a positive relation between capital 
and the valuation allowance if banks use the valuation allowance to create hidden reserves.  The 
costs of creating the “hidden” reserve are lower for banks with greater capital.  The marginal 
effect of CAPBELOW is negative (p-value = 0.105) in the probit equation and the coefficient 
estimate is negative and significant in the linear equation. 
These results do not suggest that the poorly capitalized banks create hidden reserves.  
One explanation for the negative association is that low capital correlates with the bank’s ability 
to argue (i.e., provide positive evidence according to SFAS 109) that DTAs are likely to be 
realized in future periods.  Hence, the bank is forced to report a valuation allowance. 
For well-capitalized banks, however, the coefficient estimate on a bank’s Tier 1 capital 
ratio is positive and significant in the linear equation.  The marginal effect of capital on the 
                                                 
6 See Maddala (1983) for a discussion of the use of two-stage models to address the type of data truncation problem 
that the valuation allowance creates.  Another specification that will address the data truncation is a tobit model.  A 
tobit model is a special case of the selection model that constrains the coefficients on the probit equation and the 
linear equation in the selection model to be the same. 
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likelihood that the bank will report a valuation allowance is not significantly different from zero 
for the relatively well-capitalized banks.7 
The results for the control variables also suggest that the valuation allowance is not 
adopted primarily for the purpose of managing current-period earnings, but rather to follow the 
guidelines of SFAS 109.  In the probit model, NOLs have a significant positive impact on the 
likelihood that a bank reports a valuation allowance.  However, conditional on reporting a 
valuation allowance, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient estimate of 0.0804, NOLs are 
not a significant determinant of the amount of the VA.  We note that the expiration of NOLs and 
other carryforwards varies across firms.  The variation reduces the power of this model to control 
for the effect of the components of DTAs on the nondiscretionary portion of the VA.  However, 
we cannot control for this variation because banks do not consistently report the exact expiration 
dates of NOLs; some banks report only the latest expiration date and others report a range of 
dates.  Other carryforwards (OTHERCF) also significantly increase the likelihood of an 
allowance (p-value = 0.029).  If a bank reports a VA, its magnitude is negatively related to the 
magnitude of the other carryforwards. 
As a percent of DTAs, loan loss provisions are consistently and negatively related to a 
bank’s decision to establish a valuation allowance and to the amount of the allowance.  The sign 
suggests that because the reversal period until a specific loan is written off for tax purposes is 
likely short, banks can more easily justify the future realizability of DTAs related to LLPs than 
they can DTAs related to other temporary differences.  Thus, the bank can avoid establishing a 
valuation allowance.  As a percent of DTAs, nonaccrual interest is positively, and loan fees are 
negatively, related to the conditional amount of the valuation allowance.  However, neither DTA 
component is related to the decision to adopt an allowance.  
                                                 
7 We also estimate the model after excluding money center banks (MCBs), whose operations are different from 
those of retail banks, from the sample.  For the probit equation, the results are the same.  For the linear equation, the 
results are similar except that the significance of the coefficient estimate on CAPABOVE is lower (p-value = 0.12).  
Thus, the phenomenon of creating hidden reserves appears to be most concentrated and statistically detectible in the 
large MCBs. 
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The proxies for the future realizability of deferred tax assets also explain cross-sectional 
variation in the valuation allowance.  The model includes deferred tax liabilities as a percent of 
DTAs, and we predict that banks with more DTLs will be more able to justify not recording a 
valuation allowance.  Approximately 85% of the sample has a ratio between zero and one.  The 
remaining 15% of the sample observations have ratios that range between 1.02 and 6.61.  
Because of the skewness of this ratio, we include a second regressor in the model that allows for 
a nonlinear association between DTLs as a percent of DTAs and the valuation allowance.  
DTLvDTA is an interaction variable that equals DTLs as a percent of DTAs when deferred tax 
liabilities are greater than deferred tax assets, and equals zero otherwise.  We predict that banks 
with a ratio greater than one (i.e., deferred tax liabilities are greater than deferred tax assets) will 
have greater justification for not recording a valuation allowance. 
Table 2 reports tha t neither of the explanatory variables related to a bank’s DTL position 
affects the likelihood that a bank will establish a valuation allowance.  However, both affect the 
magnitude of the allowance in the linear model.  The negative association between DTLs and the 
valuation allowance and the positive association between the interaction variable and the 
valuation allowance suggest that the ratio justifies a lower valuation allowance.  However, the 
importance of this variable as a justification diminishes as it becomes significantly greater than 
one.   
Like deferred tax liabilities, the variables HROA and ROAt+1 are proxies for evidence 
that banks can use to justify not recording a valuation allowance.  Table 2 indicates that banks 
with greater historical ROA, which is positive evidence of realizability, are less likely to report a 
valuation allowance, and if they report one, they will report a lower VA. 8   
                                                 
8 We also estimate the model with the five-year historical EPS growth rate from the IBES background file 
(GROWTH) included as an additional explanatory variable.  GROWTH represents a summary measure of the 
various proxies that measure positive and negative evidence of future income from Behn, Eaton, and Williams 
(1998).  The coefficient on GROWTH is not significant.  Including the growth rate in the model significantly 
reduces the number of observations from 225 to 124 in the probit equation, and there are only 40 firms that record 
valuation allowances greater than zero at the adoption date.  
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The results for ROAt+1 are not consistent with the results for HROA.  Instead, they are 
influenced by a single “outlier” observation which we identify by using an OLS estimation of the 
linear equation.  The median value of ROAt+1 is 0.0099 for the 86 observations with nonzero 
valuation allowances.  The ROAt+1 for one bank is -0.21 and the second lowest value of ROAt+1 
is -0.038.  When we remove this observation, we see that the marginal effects of the regressors in 
the probit model are unchanged and the marginal effect of ROAt+1 remains insignificant.  
However, in the linear equation, the coefficient estimate on ROAt+1 is negative and significant 
(p-value = 0.08).  Thus, like HROA, future ROA affects the magnitude of the valuation 
allowance, if the bank reports one. 
Taken together, the results suggest that banks do not record a valuation allowance for the 
sole purpose of managing earnings.  Only 86 of the 225 banks establish any valuation allowance.  
Their decision to establish a VA is related to the sources of DTAs and the proxies for the positive 
or negative evidence about the future realizability of the DTAs.  However, if they do set an 
allowance and if the bank is sufficiently well capitalized to absorb the current-period earnings 
impact of a higher VA, then the amount of the allowance increases with the bank’s capital.  
The probit model correctly classifies 79.6% of the 225 observations (91.4% of the banks 
without a valuation allowance and 60.5% of the banks with a valuation allowance).  A maximum 
likelihood estimation of the model produces results (not presented here) similar to the consistent 
(but not efficient) estimates from the two-stage least squares estimation procedure. 
The results in Table 2 are robust to excluding from the sample ten banks that adopted 
SFAS 109 using the retroactive method rather than the cumulative effect method.  Banks that 
chose the retroactive method may have had different earnings management incentives from the 
incentives of banks that chose the cumulative effect method.9  The results are also robust to 
excluding from the sample 25 banks that had previously adopted SFAS 96.  For the early 
                                                 
9 The standard allowed a choice of two transition methods.  An entity could restate prior years’ results and adjust its 
retained earnings.  Or, it could charge the cumulative effect of the change in the transition year as a change in 
accounting principles (reported below income from continuing operations).  MCBs were  more likely to use the 
retroactive method.  Use of the retroactive method empirically is associated with both larger adjustments in absolute 
terms and as a percent of income before the cumulative effect of the adjustment.   
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adopters, the transition adjustment to SFAS 109 is likely to be lower than the adjustment that 
would be required for the banks that switched to SFAS 109 directly from APB 11.10  The only 
exception is that the significance level for CAPBELOW falls (p-value = 0.12) in the probit 
equation.  This decrease in significance is consistent with the correlation between the early 
adopters and MCBs.  Results of the linear equation are unchanged. 
 
4.  Tests of earnings management after the adoption date 
After a bank adopts SFAS 109, increasing (decreasing) the valuation allowance will 
decrease (increase) earnings through income tax expense.  In this section, we analyze the 
association between changes in the valuation allowance and earnings management incentives.  
For the period subsequent to SFAS 109 adoption, we predict that banks will use their valuation 
allowance accounts to manage earnings.  We consider two earnings targets, the consensus 
analyst forecast of earnings and historical earnings.   
The importance of meeting or beating analyst expectations is well established in the 
financial press.  Anecdotal discussions suggest that if a firm falls short of expectations, its stock 
price declines as investors reassess the expected future earnings that are impounded in the price. 
Recently, researchers have documented systematic evidence on the benefits and related 
managerial incentives of managing earnings toward analyst forecasts (see, for example, Robb, 
1998; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 1999; Bartov, Givoly, and 
Hayn, 2001; Kasznik and McNichols, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002; and Dhaliwal, Gleason, and 
Mills, 2002).  The evidence suggests that managers attribute value to meeting forecasts, whether 
it is real or perceived. 
 
{INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.} 
                                                 
10 SFAS 96 became effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1988.  However, the effective date was 
delayed, and eventually SFAS 109 superseded SFAS 96.  Some firms adopted SFAS 96 early.  Characteristics of 
these early adopters suggest that there was a selection bias in the banks that switched to SFAS 96 before they 
adopted SFAS 109.  See Read and Bartsch (1992) for a detailed comparison of SFAS 109 with APB 11 and SFAS 
96. 
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Figure 1 presents preliminary univariate evidence that changes in the valuation allowance 
correspond to the degree that the banks’ unadjusted earnings deviate from the consensus analyst 
forecast.  The figure shows the change in the valuation allowance on a per-share basis (DVA) for 
14 partitions of the sample banks.  We partition the banks by the deviation of reported earnings 
per share (EPS) before the change in the valuation allowance (“unadjusted” earnings).  We draw 
our data from the mean consensus analyst forecast of EPS from IBES (DEVIBES).  We discard 
observations for which the forecast is more than three months old.  We choose 14 categories so 
that each category can contain observations with either positive or negative deviations from the 
consensus forecast and a reasonable number of observations per category.  Categories 1 through 
12 represent observations with DEVIBES < 0; categories 13 and 14 represent observations with 
DEVIBES  0. 
We find a clear, increasing pattern in both the mean and median decrease (income-
increasing change) in the valuation allowance across the rankings, which is most evident in the 
lowest four categories of banks.  The chart below the figure shows that banks in the higher 
categories had the opportunity to decrease the allowance (increase income) by more than the per-
share amount of the change in the valuation allowance.  However, these banks that have a mean 
(and median) lagged valuation allowance that is greater than the average (median) decrease in 
the valuation allowance do not decrease their valuation allowance to zero and thus maximize 
reported income.   
In addition to the incentives that banks have to increase earnings, they may also have 
incentives to use their discretion to decrease earnings in some periods.  If a bank manages 
earnings to exceed a forecast, but not by too much, then this pattern is consistent with the claim 
that firms attempt to “manage” future forecasts so that they can continue to meet or beat them in 
future periods.  For example, the SEC accused W.R. Grace of reducing earnings toward an 
internal, but publicized, earnings target (Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1999), to save up “extra” 
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profits from the current period against future periods when the firm came in below target.  Thus, 
a firm with earnings substantially above a forecast may use its discretion to reduce earnings. 
 Prior studies of earnings management in the banking industry have considered historical 
earnings as a target rather than the consensus analyst forecast (e.g., Beatty, Chamberlain, and 
Magliolo, 1995; Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen, 1995).  Management may use its discretion to 
beat historical earnings or to reduce the time-series volatility of earnings (i.e., income 
smoothing).  Banks have incentives to smooth earnings to reduce the risk of capital requirement 
violation.  In addition, indirect evidence on the costs of earnings volatility suggests a positive 
relation between earnings volatility and the cost of debt (Collins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal, 1981; 
Lys, 1984; Imhoff and Thomas, 1988; Bartov, 1993) and the cost of equity (Beaver, Kettler, and 
Scholes, 1970).11   
In our empirical analysis, we allow for both one-sided earnings management, which we 
define as managing earnings up to meet or beat a target, and for two-sided earnings management, 
which includes managing earnings upwards when they are below the target and down when they 
are above the target.  We include proxies for the two earnings management targets.  We assume 
that banks manage earnings toward the IBES consensus forecast, and separately assume that they 
manage earnings toward average historical earnings.  We also include proxy variables for these 
two incentives together in one regression.  Doing so allows managers to trade off the costs and 
benefits of managing towards the consensus forecast and average historical earnings. 
 
A. Empirical model and variable definitions 
To test the significance of the relation between changes in the valuation allowance and 
earnings management incentives, we use a multiple regression analysis that controls for the 
nondiscretionary component of the change in the valuation allowance.  In this analysis, we first 
control for changes in the components of DTAs (DCOMPONENTS) and changes in a bank’s 
                                                 
11 For a more complete discussion of this literature, see Minton and Schrand (1999). 
  
 
19 
assessment of the realizability of the DTAs (DFUT_REAL), which represent nondiscretionary 
sources of changes in the valuation allowance.  We then include proxies for earnings 
management incentives.  Because our analysis focuses on the management of earnings per share 
(EPS) toward the forecast and historical EPSs, we express all variables on a per-share basis.  The 
regression model is:   
 
 ebfla ++D+D+=D ååå
i
i
k
k
j
j EARNMGMTREALFUTCOMPONENTSVA _  (3) 
 
We compute the change in the valuation allowance (DVA) and the changes in the DTA 
components on a per-share basis.  In some cases, the sample banks made retroactive restatements 
of their valuation allowances due to a current-period acquisition.  For these bank-year 
observations, we adjust the year t-1 valuation allowance that we use in the calculation of DVA 
for year t to the amount reported in the year t financial statements.  Thus, in all cases, the DVA 
variable represents the impact of the valuation allowance changes on reported income.  The 
proxies for DFUT_REAL are the change in deferred tax liabilities per share, the change in the 
three-year average historical EPS, and the change in one-year-ahead EPS. 
We perform separate measurements of the association between changes in the valuation 
allowance and deviations from the target for all observations with unadjusted earnings below the 
forecast (BELOW_IBES) and above the forecast (ABOVE_IBES).  Doing so allows us to 
differentiate one-sided earnings management from two-sided earnings management.  Both of 
these proxies for earnings management incentives are a function of the deviation of the bank’s 
unadjusted earnings from the consensus analyst forecast (DEVIBES).  If the bank’s unadjusted 
EPS is below the target (DEVIBES < 0), then BELOW_IBES equals the deviation; otherwise, 
BELOW_IBES equals zero.  If the bank’s unadjusted EPS is above the target (DEVIBES > 0), 
then ABOVE_IBES equals the deviation; otherwise, ABOVE_IBES equals zero.  We define the 
proxies for the incentives to manage toward historical earnings (BELOW_HIST and 
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ABOVE_HIST) using the same method, which is based on the deviation of current-period 
earnings from the average historical EPS.  We compute this deviation over the period t-1 to t-3 
(DEVHIST). 
Regardless of whether bank managers are engaging in one-sided earnings management to 
maximize income or attempting to smooth income, we predict that there will be a positive 
association between BELOW_IBES (or BELOW_HIST) and the change in the valuation 
allowance.  A positive coefficient will imply that on average, firms with greater deviations below 
the target (more negative BELOW_IBES or BELOW_HIST) will record larger decreases in the 
valuation allowance, and thus higher reported earnings.  If a manager's objective is income 
smoothing, we also predict a positive association between ABOVE_IBES (or ABOVE_HIST) 
and the adjustment to the valuation allowance.  A positive coefficient will imply that on average, 
firms with greater deviations above the target will record larger increases in the valuation 
allowance, and thus lower reported earnings.  If a manager's objective is to maximize reported 
earnings, we expect no association between ABOVE_IBES (or ABOVE_HIST) and DVA. 
Managers can have incentives to manage earnings toward both the consensus forecast and 
historical earnings.  We estimate the model with ABOVE_IBES and BELOW_IBES in one 
specification, and separately with ABOVE_HIST and BELOW_HIST.  In a third specification, 
we include both the deviations of unadjusted earnings from historical earnings and from the 
analyst forecast target.  Moehrle (2002) provides evidence that firms reverse previously recorded 
restructuring charges to meet both analyst forecast and historical earnings targets. 
There are three potential specification and measurement issues associated with equation 
(3).  First, if analysts can perfectly predict earnings before the valuation allowance (“unadjusted” 
earnings) and the amount of a change in the valuation allowance, then DEVIBES will exactly 
equal the change in the valuation allowance (DVA).  In this case, the coefficient on the 
DEVIBES variables will be one, even when the change in the valuation allowance is completely 
nondiscretionary, and regardless of whether the control variables are adequate for measuring 
changes in the components of DTAs (DCOMPONENTS) and changes in a bank’s assessment of 
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the realizability of the DTAs (DFUT_REAL).  A correlation between DVA and DEVIBES will 
bias the results in favor of our hypotheses. 
The degree to which this potential bias affects our conclusions depends on two key 
factors, how well analysts forecast earnings before the valuation allowance, and how well they 
forecast the valuation allowance.  If the forecast error on earnings before the valuation allowance 
swamps the change in the valuation allowance and this error is random, then the mechanical 
relation between DEVIBES and DVA will not be strong.  Likewise, if analysts are unable to 
predict the change in the valuation allowance, including a DVA that is totally nondiscretionary, 
then the mechanical relation will not be strong.  Given the relative magnitudes of EPS compared 
to DVA per share, it is likely that the error in predicting EPS is much greater than DVA per 
share.  On average, the reported EPS is $1.99, while DVA is only $0.05 per share.  Also, given 
that the tax footnote is generally not included in 10-Qs so that quarterly information on the 
valuation allowance or the components of deferred taxes is not publicly available, it is unlikely 
that analysts have good information on which to predict the valuation allowance.  
The second specification issue is that the extent to which current-period earnings deviate 
from the average historical earnings target may be correlated with the proxies for changes in 
management's assessment of future profitability and DTA realizability (DFUT_REAL).  
However, in our regression analysis, traditional tests for multicollinearity do not suggest that 
multicollinearity affects the coefficient estimates.  Moreover, we predict a negative association 
between the change in the valuation allowance and DFUT_REAL and a positive association 
between DVA and ABOVE_HIST and BELOW_HIST.  Thus, our interpretation of the 
associations is not confounded by the correlation between the profitability variables and the two 
proxies for earnings management incentives.   
 Third, by specifying the proxies for earnings management incentives as the total 
deviation from the target, we assume that the valuation allowance is the only earnings 
management tool that banks can use to manage earnings toward the target.  However, banks can 
also use other discretionary accruals, such as loan loss provisions, to manage earnings (see 
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Beatty et al., 1995, and Collins et al., 1995).  This specification issue biases against finding a 
significant association between deviations from the target and the change in the valuation 
allowance. 
 
B. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents pooled descriptive statistics of the change in the valuation allowance.  
The table also provides descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in equation (3) for all 
sample bank-year observations with non-missing data that we use to estimate the equation (220 
bank-year observations for 80 banks).   
Bank-year observations begin in the year after the bank adopts SFAS 109 and continue 
through fiscal 1998.  Both the mean and median changes in the valuation allowance per share 
(DVA) are negative.  The decreases in the valuation allowance are consistent with the generally 
improving performance of financial institutions during the sample period.  As evidence of the 
improving performance, the change in historical EPS (DHEPS) and the change in one-year-ahead 
EPS (DEPSt+1) are positive.  The decreases in the valuation allowance are also consistent with 
the financial press’s claim that firms overestimate valuation allowances at adoption and decrease 
them over time to manage earnings. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 3 HERE.} 
 
Changes in DTAs related to other postretirement benefits (DOPEB) are the largest 
change.  On average, these changes are $0.041 per share.  The average change in DTAs related 
to net operating loss carryforwards (DNOL) is negative because the carryforwards are used 
against positive earnings during this time period, or expire.  The average changes in other DTA 
components are small.  Only the change in DTAs associated with loan loss provisions (DLLP) 
has a nonzero median. 
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Of the 220 observations, 186 have EPS before the change in the valuation allowance 
(unadjusted earnings) below the forecasted EPS, and 34 observations have unadjusted EPS above 
the target.  The mean deviation of EPS from the targeted EPS is -0.03 for the observations below 
target compared to 0.02 for the observations above target.  The small number of ABOVE_IBES 
firms (15.5% of the total) indicates that analysts were overly optimistic during the sample period.  
If banks expect analysts to be optimistic, this expectation can affect banks’ incentives to manage 
earnings toward the consensus forecast.  For example, a bank with earnings just below the 
forecast might not have incentives to meet the forecast since most of the bank’s peers were also 
not meeting their forecasts.   
The univariate results reported in Figure 1 are consistent with this expectation of bank 
behavior.  Decreases in the VA are concentrated in the four categories of banks with the greatest 
deviations from the IBES consensus forecast.  However, banks close to the forecast show less 
evidence that they use the valuation allowance to increase earnings toward the forecast.  
Analyst optimism can also affect the earnings management incentives for banks with 
earnings above the forecast.  These banks might have greater incentives to manage earnings 
down toward the consensus forecast, since most of the bank’s peers are not “beating” the 
forecast.  Unfortunately, the small sample of banks with earnings above the forecast reduces the 
empirical power of this proxy for detecting earnings management from above.  For the 
alternative target for earnings management, there are 76 observations with unadjusted EPS below 
historical EPS, and 144 observations (65.5% of the total) with unadjusted EPS above the 
historical target. 
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables included 
in equation (3).  Correlation coefficients that are significant at the 5% level are reported in bold.  
In general, the changes in the components of DTAs are not highly correlated with each other.  
Only four pairs exhibit a significant correlation coefficient, but the magnitudes are small.  The 
two proxies for changes in expectations about future income realizations (DHEPS and DEPSt+1) 
are correlated with some of the changes in DTA components.   
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The positive and significant correlation between one-year-ahead EPS and changes in 
other carryforwards is 0.494.  This correlation indicates that banks with large increases in 
carryforwards from period t-1 to period t had larger increases in earnings from period t to period 
t+1.  Thus, following a bad year that creates carryforwards (such as the alternative minimum tax 
credit), the banks are more likely to have larger increases in earnings and return to profitability, 
possibly due in part to using the carryforwards. 
The proxies for earnings management incentives related to analyst forecasts (DEVIBES) 
and historical earnings (DEVHIST) are significantly, negatively correlated, although the 
magnitude of the correlation is small (coefficient = -0.227).  In the regression analysis, we 
include these proxies for earnings management incentives separately in one specification of 
equation (3) and together in another.  The change in historical earnings per share (DHEPS) is 
highly correlated with DEVHIST, with a correlation coefficient of 0.863.  We expect this 
correlation, since we define both variables by using average historical EPS.  However, as 
discussed earlier, we predict that the associations between these two variables and the change in 
valuation allowance will have opposite signs.  Thus, as noted previously, the correlation will not 
confound interpretation of the results. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 4 HERE.} 
 
The adoption-date test results reported in Section 3 indicate that the phenomenon of 
creating hidden reserves is most concentrated in the large, well-capitalized money center banks.  
Therefore, we conduct post-adoption earnings management tests separately for the full sample 
and for the subsample of non-MCBs.  To conserve space, we report the results for the non-MCBs 
only and discuss differences, if any, with the full sample results. 
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C. Results of subsequent-period tests 
Table 5 presents the regression results for three versions of equation (3) that differ in the 
proxies for earnings management incentives.  The regression models are estimated for 190 
pooled bank-year observations of non-MCBs with non-missing data in any year following the 
year of adoption through fiscal 1998.  All observations have a nonzero valuation allowance at the 
beginning of the year.  (The full sample contains 220 bank-year observations.)  We eliminate 
from the regressions influential observations, which we identify based on studentized residuals, 
Cook’s D, and the standard measures of the observation’s influence on the predicted value.  We 
report the number of observations in the final sample at the bottom of the table.  The models 
include fixed-year-effect dummy variables; however, we do not report the coefficient estimates 
on these variables.  
The results about earnings management are mixed across the three specifications of 
model (3).  In the first equation, the estimated coefficient on BELOW_IBES is significantly 
positive, but that on ABOVE_IBES is indistinguishably different from zero.  This finding 
suggests that banks manage EPS upward to the consensus IBES forecast, but they do not engage 
in earnings smoothing by also managing earnings downward. 
In contrast, for the full sample, the estimated coefficients on both BELOW_IBES and 
ABOVE_IBES are indistinguishably different from zero.  The greater significance of the 
earnings management results for the non-MCB sample contrasts with the earlier finding that the 
well-capitalized MCBs are more likely to create the hidden reserves when they adopt SFAS 109.  
Differences in power across the MCB and non-MCB samples do not explain this finding.  One 
explanation for the combination of results is that the MCBs have a greater ability to generate 
hidden reserves ex ante, expecting to use them in subsequent periods.  However, these 
institutions do not need to decrease the reserve to maximize earnings during what is an 
economically profitable sample period for banks.  By contrast, smaller and less profitable banks 
have fewer opportunities than MCBs to create hidden reserves.  However, to the extent they are 
created, these smaller banks are more likely to need to decrease the reserve in subsequent periods 
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to meet earnings targets.  The larger, more profitable MCBs might also have more tools available 
to manage earnings besides the valuation allowance account. 
In the second equation, the coefficients on both BELOW_HIST and ABOVE_HIST are 
significantly, positively associated with DVA at the 1% level.  Positive coefficients on the 
variables in both directions suggest the presence of earnings smoothing toward the historical 
earnings targets.  These results are similar in the full sample (not tabulated). 
In the final equation, when we include proxies related to both earnings targets in the 
model, the coefficient estimates on BELOW_HIST and ABOVE_HIST remain significantly 
positive, but the coefficient estimates on BELOW_IBES and ABOVE_IBES also are 
significantly positive.  If unadjusted earnings were $1 below the IBES forecast but $1 above the 
historical EPS, the net effect on DVA would be a reduction of $0.044 (equals –0.139 + 0.095), 
all else equal.  Positive coefficients on the variables in both directions suggest the presence of 
earnings smoothing toward the targets. 
Although the statistical significance of BELOW_IBES and ABOVE_IBES in the third 
specification can be explained by the correlation between the proxies for the two earnings 
management objectives, as shown in Table 4, statistical procedures do not identify 
multicollinearity as a problem for the interpretation of the coefficient estimates or their standard 
errors. 
The results for the control variables – changes in the components of DTAs and changes 
in the bank’s assessment of the realizability of the DTAs – are generally as we expected.  The 
estimated coefficients on the changes in DTAs attributable to changes in NOLs, OTHERCFs, 
and LLPs are significantly positive.  In addition, the estimated coefficients on DDEFCOMP in 
the first equation and DREALE in the last two equations are statistically positive.  The positive 
association between changes in loan loss provisions and DVA contrasts with the negative 
association between the level of LLPs and the level of the VA set at adoption, as reported in 
Table 2.  The negative association in levels at the adoption date suggests that firms are able to 
justify not recording a valuation allowance, possibly because the DTAs related to LLPs reverse 
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relatively quickly.  The positive association between changes in the DTAs related to LLPs and 
the change in the valuation allowance is consistent with the hypothesis that increased loan loss 
provisions provide evidence on future realizability of DTAs.  
A change in NOLs has the largest economic effect on the change in the valuation 
allowance.  A one-dollar per share change in NOLs implies a $0.35-$0.38 per-share change in 
the valuation allowance.  For the full sample, only DNOL, DOTHERCF, and DLLP exhibit 
significant explanatory power.  The magnitudes of coefficient estimates on these three variables 
are smaller than those for the subsample.  For example, a one-dollar per share change in NOLs 
implies a $0.27-$0.30 per-share change in the valuation allowance. 
For the proxies for the changes in the future realizability of DTAs, we find that the 
change in the average historical EPS, but not the change in one-year-ahead EPS, has a 
statistically negative association with DVA in all three equations.  (For the full sample, DEPSt+1 
has a significant (at the 10% level) negative coefficient in the first equation.)  These results 
confirm our predictions and indicate that bank managers use historical information to predict 
future profitability, thus justifying valuation allowance adjustments that follow the guidelines of 
SFAS 109.   
We find that changes in DTLs are not significantly associated with changes in the 
valuation allowance.  The lack of explanatory power is consistent with Brezovec and Snow’s 
(1992) conjecture that in the banking industry, DTLs are generally not as important as other 
evidence about future realizability, because they are too short- lived to justify the probable 
realization of DTAs that are related to loan loss provisions and postretirement benefits. 
We conduct two sets of sensitivity analyses.  First, we scale the changes in the valuation 
allowance and deferred tax asset components by lagged deferred tax assets, as in Miller and 
Skinner (1998).  The estimated coefficients on the changes in net operating loss carryforwards 
and loan loss provisions are statistically positive.  The estimated coefficient on the change in 
historical return on assets (the counterpart of DHEPS) is negative, and those on BELOW_HIST 
and ABOVE_HIST (both scaled by lagged total assets) are significantly positive.  Second, we 
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estimate the regressions by event year.  The overall results are qualitatively similar to those 
based on the pooled sample.  In particular, the estimated coefficients on DNOL and DOTHERCF 
are significantly positive, the estimated coefficient on DHEPS is negative, and those on 
BELOW_IBES, BELOW_HIST and ABOVE_HIST are statistically positive in about half of the 
year-by-year regressions. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 5 HERE.} 
 
Table 6 reports our results based on a refinement of equation (3) that includes adjusted 
proxy variables for earnings management incentives.  A bank’s ability to manage earnings 
upward toward a target is limited by the amount of the valuation allowance at the beginning of 
the period.  To account for this limitation, we define two new proxies for earnings management 
incentives when unadjusted earnings are below the target.  The adjusted variables 
(A_BELOW_IBES and A_BELOW_HIST) are equal to the minimum (in absolute value) of the 
deviation from the target on a per-share basis and the valuation allowance as of the beginning of 
the year on a per-share basis.  For example, if BELOW_HIST is –0.07, but the amount of the 
beginning balance of the valuation allowance is only –0.03, then we set A_BELOW_HIST equal 
to –0.03.  We report results for the sample of non-MCBs.  Results (not tabulated) for the full 
sample are qualitatively similar.   
Overall, the coefficient estimates on the changes in the DTA components and the proxies 
for the changes in the future realizability of DTAs are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 5.  However, the evidence on the presence of earnings management toward the two 
earnings targets is stronger.  The significant positive coefficient estimates on the proxies for 
earnings management incentives, adjusted to reflect the maximum earnings that the bank can 
manage, further support the earlier evidence that banks use the allowance to smooth income 
toward the targets. 
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{INSERT TABLE 6 HERE.} 
 
The evidence that earnings management occurs, despite the guidelines in SFAS 109 that 
bias against finding such results, is consistent with earnings management.  Banks with earnings 
below the target decrease the valuation allowance (or increase it less than the expected amount).  
However, if we assume that the information that analysts use to make forecasts is correlated with 
information that managers use to provide positive evidence about a bank's future prospects, it 
should be more difficult for these below-target banks to justify a lower allowance. It should also 
be more difficult for banks with a negative trend in earnings (DEVHIST < 0) to justify a lower 
allowance.  The converse holds for banks that have earnings above the target.  These banks 
should be better able to justify a decrease in the valuation account and an increase in earnings.  
However, we do not find evidence that banks use the valuation account for this purpose.  Taken 
together, our results suggest that bank managers use the valuation allowance account to smooth 
unadjusted earnings toward the forecast and historical earnings per share.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate whether banks strategically set a high valuation allowance 
associated with deferred tax assets (DTAs) for the purpose of managing earnings in subsequent 
periods.  When SFAS 109 first went into effect in 1992, it required recording valuation 
allowances against DTAs.  When banks adopted the standard, the well-capitalized banks 
appeared to create hidden reserves conditional on establishing a valuation allowance.  These 
banks had sufficient capital to absorb the initial negative impact of recording an allowance. 
In later periods, we find that discretionary changes in the valuation allowance against 
deferred tax assets are associated with deviations of the banks' unadjusted earnings from the 
consensus analyst forecast and from average historical earnings.  The pattern of the discretionary 
changes is consistent with income-increasing earnings management when earnings before 
adjusting the valuation allowance are below the targets, and income-decreasing management 
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when unadjusted earnings are above the targets.  We identify the discretionary changes in the 
valuation allowance by using a model that controls for factors that contribute to nondiscretionary 
changes in the valuation allowance based on the guidelines of SFAS 109.  These factors include 
changes in the components of DTAs as well as changes in management’s assessment of the 
bank's future profitability. 
Our results pertain to a specific earnings management tool—the valuation allowance 
against DTAs—as it is used by a specific sample—banks.  The restricted sample allows us to 
model the nondiscretionary factors that affect the valuation allowance and subsequent changes to 
the VA, and to produce more powerful tests of earnings management behavior that uses this 
account.   
The more powerful tests may explain the conflict between our results and those of Miller 
and Skinner (1998).  Their study, which is based on a sample of firms from multiple industries, 
finds no evidence that firms use the allowance account for earnings management.  
While our study resolves this conflict, at the same time, our restricted sample brings up 
questions about the generalizability of the results to firms in other industries, and to earnings 
management with other sources of hidden reserves.  However, the proxies for earnings 
management incentives that we examine, and the guidelines for using the valuation allowance 
account, are not unique to banks.  Thus, we would expect to find similar results for firms in other 
industries if we could conduct tests that adequately controlled for the nondiscretionary portion of 
the valuation allowance and subsequent changes to this account. 
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  Figure 1 
Mean and Median Per Share Changes in the Valuation Allowance Account by the Deviation 
from the I/B/E/S forecast
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
               # OBS. 19 19 20 19 20 19 20 19 20 19 20 19 19 20 
               DEVIBES               
   Mean -1.529 -0.468 -0.275 -0.207 -0.170 -0.144 -0.125 -0.109 -0.091 -0.071 -0.052 -0.017 0.033 5.237 
   Median -0.819 -0.458 -0.273 -0.207 -0.168 -0.144 -0.125 -0.109 -0.091 -0.071 -0.053 -0.017 0.022 0.211 
               DVA               
   Mean -0.498 -0.277 -0.126 -0.022 -0.059 -0.012 -0.017 -0.030 -0.019 -0.002 0.011 -0.007 -0.016 -0.005 
   Median -0.342 -0.187 -0.091 -0.010 -0.043 -0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.011 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 
               LAGVA_PS              
   Mean 1.238 0.491 0.268 0.239 0.294 0.253 0.143 0.096 0.082 0.128 0.112 0.073 0.135 0.822 
   Median 0.710 0.398 0.200 0.046 0.153 0.087 0.029 0.051 0.062 0.048 0.058 0.062 0.051 0.077 
               
 
Figure 1 shows the mean and median per share changes in the valuation allowance for partitions of the sample banks.  We base these 
changes on the deviation of their “unadjusted” earnings from the IBES forecast.  DEVIBES is less than 0 for all banks ranked 1 through 
12; DEVIBES is greater than or equal to 0 for banks ranked 13 and 14.  The table below the figure shows the number of observations in 
each ranking, the mean and median levels of DEVIBES, the change in the valuation allowance on a per share basis (DVA), and the lagged 
valuation allowance on a per share basis (LAGVA_PS), across the 14 categories of banks.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of deferred tax assets at adoption of SFAS 109 (N=235) 
 
Adoption-year descriptive statistics for 235 commercial banks that adopted SFAS 109 in 1993.  We require the 
sample banks to have non-missing data and a December fiscal year end.  The sample is drawn from the 1993 
Compustat Bank Annual file.  
 
(Dollar figures in millions) 
       
Variable  Mean Std Dev Min Max N > 0 % > 0 
       
       
DTA $ 102.6 $ 367.4 $ 0.1 $ 3,794.0 235 100.0% 
DTL 71.5 258.7 0.0 2,631.0 231 98.3% 
VA 11.1 76.3 0.0 1,120.0 92 39.1% 
NOL 3.5 22.2 0.0 283.0 55 23.4% 
OTHERCF 2.9 21.2 0.0 300.0 24 10.2% 
LLP 57.3 193.2 0.0 1,801.0 229 97.4% 
OPEB 3.9 28.1 0.0 390.0 73 31.1% 
DEFCOMP 0.4 1.6 0.0 14.9 58 24.7% 
NACCINT 1.0 7.9 0.0 89.0 26 11.1% 
REALE 3.9 22.4 0.0 288.0 75 31.9% 
LNFEE 0.7 4.1 0.0 56.0 65 27.7% 
 
DTL / DTA 58.9% 71.5% 0.0% 660.9% 231 98.3% 
VA / DTA 13.1% 26.1% 0.0% 100.0% 92 39.1% 
NOL / DTA 5.3% 15.7% 0.0% 90.5% 55 23.4% 
OTHERCF / DTA 1.4% 6.1% 0.0% 67.0% 24 10.2% 
LLP / DTA 61.3% 21.9% 0.0% 100.0% 229 97.4% 
OPEB / DTA 3.5% 7.0% 0.0% 34.1% 73 31.1% 
DEFCOMP / DTA 2.6% 6.1% 0.0% 35.2% 58 24.7% 
NACCINT / DTA 1.0% 4.2% 0.0% 47.1% 26 11.1% 
REALE / DTA 3.3% 6.5% 0.0% 33.6% 75 31.9% 
LNFEE / DTA 2.7% 6.3% 0.0% 46.0% 65 27.7% 
       
 
DTA = Deferred tax assets  
DTL = Deferred tax liabilities 
VA = Valuation allowance for deferred tax assets  
NOL = DTA attributable to net operating loss carryforwards 
OTHERCF = DTA attributable to carryforwards other than NOLs  
LLP = DTA attributable to loan loss provisions 
OPEB = DTA attributable to other postretirement benefits 
DEFCOMP = DTA attributable to deferred compensation 
NACCINT = DTA attributable to nonaccrual interest 
REALE = DTA attributable to real estate assets acquired in foreclosure 
LNFEE = DTA attributable to loan origination fees 
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Table 2 
Analysis of the determinants of the valuation allowance at adoption 
 
The table shows our two-stage least squares estimation of a model of the determinants of firms’ valuation allowance 
at adoption of SFAS 109.  The probit equation uses 225 bank observations with non-missing data to model the 
likelihood that the banks report a valuation allowance.  The dependent variable equals one if the valuation allowance 
is greater than zero, and zero otherwise.  The linear equation models the amount of the valuation allowance, scaled 
by DTAs, for the 86 observations with a non-zero valuation allowance.  The potential determinants include the 
components of DTAs, proxies for the future realizability of DTAs, and proxies for earnings management incentives. 
 
  Probit Equation  Linear Equation 
 
Variable  
Pred. 
Sign 
Marginal 
effect 
2-sided 
p-value 
  
Coeff 
2-sided 
p-value 
       
Intercept ? 0.5064 0.0469  0.8085 0.0000 
     
Components of DTAs:     
NOL / DTA  + 3.2285 0.0028  0.0804 0.5474 
OTHERCF / DTA   + 3.1305 0.0290  -0.6468 0.0151 
LLP / DTA   ? -0.5316 0.0324  -0.6392 0.0000 
OPEB / DTA   ? -0.5418 0.3597  -0.4409 0.1723 
DEFCOMP / DTA   ? -0.8783 0.2409  0.4209 0.2994 
NACCINT / DTA   ? -1.9177 0.1446  0.9716 0.0872 
REALE / DTA   ? -0.0825 0.9000  -0.2504 0.3515 
LNFEE / DTA  ? 0.1935 0.7529  -0.7971 0.0241 
    
Proxies for future    
realizability of DTAs:    
DTL / DTA   - -0.1988 0.2856  -0.4551 0.0000 
DTLvDTA   ? 0.0573 0.7302  0.3267 0.0000 
HROA   - -44.0106 0.0007  -11.9561 0.0009 
ROA t+1  - 7.6943 0.5310  1.3689 0.2159 
    
Proxies for earnings    
management incentives:    
CAPABOVE  + -0.0095 0.6177  0.0237 0.0484 
CAPBELOW  + -0.0528 0.1051  -0.0270 0.0269 
       
       
Number of observations  225   86  
Likelihood ratio or Adj R2  -97.29   69.82%  
       
 
DTLvDTA   = DTL / DTA if DTL > DTA, and equals zero otherwise.  
HROA   = Mean historical ROA computed over t, t-1, and t-2 
TIER1CAP  = Tier 1 capital (Compustat data item #137). 
CAPABOVE = TIER1CAP-median size-adjusted industry TIER1CAP if this difference > 0; and 0 otherwise. 
CAPBELOW = TIER1CAP-median size-adjusted industry TIER1CAP if this difference < 0; and 0 otherwise. 
 
See additional variable definitions in Table 1.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for adjustments to the valuation allowance following adoption 
The table provides descriptive statistics for the sample banks that have non-missing data (including IBES data).  The 
sample is derived from the 235 commercial banks on the 1993 Compustat Bank Annual file with a December fiscal 
year-end, annual reports or Form 10-K filings available on Laser Disclosure, and data on the Compustat Bank 
Annual file or the IBES Summary Data file. 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
       
DVA 220 -0.050 0.200 -1.547 -0.008 0.469 
DNOL 220 -0.024 0.161 -1.257 0.000 0.600 
DOTHERCF 220 0.008 0.192 -1.378 0.000 1.779 
DLLP 220 0.004 0.303 -2.756 0.019 1.236 
DOPEB 220 0.041 0.232 -0.130 0.000 2.726 
DDEFCOMP 220 0.006 0.029 -0.083 0.000 0.349 
DNACCINT 220 0.002 0.021 -0.020 0.000 0.298 
DREALE 220 -0.010 0.046 -0.352 0.000 0.157 
DLNFEE 220 -0.001 0.021 -0.238 0.000 0.076 
       
DDTL 220 0.072 0.453 -2.859 0.043 1.972 
DHEPS 220 0.274 0.777 -2.155 0.168 5.196 
DEPSt+1 220 0.038 1.590 -9.695 0.151 11.427 
       
BELOW_IBES 220 -0.025 0.073 -0.809 -0.004 0.000 
  Non-zero observations 186 -0.030 0.078 -0.809 -0.006 0.000 
ABOVE_IBES 220 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.111 
  Non-zero observations 34 0.020 0.029 0.000 0.007 0.111 
A_BELOW_IBES 220 -0.021 0.063 -0.809 -0.004 0.000 
  Non-zero observations 183 -0.026 0.069 -0.809 -0.006 0.000 
       
BELOW_HIST 220 -0.334 0.807 -7.083 0.000 0.000 
  Non-zero observations 76 -0.966 1.133 -7.083 -0.598 -0.016 
ABOVE_HIST 220 0.671 0.977 0.000 0.313 6.893 
  Non-zero observations 144 1.025 1.047 0.005 0.657 6.893 
A_BELOW_HIST 220 -0.067 0.324 -3.023 0.000 0.000 
  Non-zero observations 74 -0.201 0.537 -3.023 -0.042 -0.001 
       
 
Variable definitions: 
DVA = Change in the valuation allowance for DTAs per share (a positive amount indicates an 
increase in the valuation allowance which is a reduction of earnings) 
DNOL = Change in DTAs attributable to net operating loss carryforwards per share  
DOTHERCF = Change in DTAs attributable to other carryforwards per share  
DLLP = Change in DTAs attributable to book loan loss provisions per share  
DOPEB = Change in DTAs attributable to other postretirement benefits per share  
DDEFCOMP = Change in DTAs attributable to deferred compensation per share 
DNACCINT = Change in DTAs attributable to deferred compensation per share  
DREALE = Change in DTAs attributable to real estate assets acquired in foreclosure per share 
DLNFEE = Change in DTAs attributable to loan origination fees per share  
 
(continued...) 
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Table 3 (…continued) 
 
 
DDTL = Change in deferred tax liabilities per share 
DHEPS = Change in mean historical earnings per share (EPS) computed over t and t-2 
DEPSt+1 = Change in EPS = EPSt+1 - EPSt 
 
DEVIBES  = EPS before adjustment to the valuation allowance – IBES consensus EPS forecast 
BELOW_IBES = DEVIBES if DEVIBES < 0; zero otherwise 
ABOVE_IBES = DEVIBES if DEVIBES > 0; zero otherwise 
A_BELOW_IBES  = Minimum of BELOW_IBES and lagged VA per share 
 
DEVHIST = EPS before adjustment to the valuation allowance – Average historical EPS (computed over t-1 
and t-3)  
BELOW_HIST = DEVHIST if DEVHIST < 0; zero otherwise 
ABOVE_HIST = DEVHIST if DEVHIST > 0; zero otherwise 
A_BELOW_HIST = Minimum of BELOW_HIST and lagged VA per share 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 4  
Pearson correlation coefficients for explanatory variables for the changes in the valuation allowance (N=220) 
Correlation coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are listed in bold.  See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 DNOL 
 
DOTHERCF DLLP DOPEB DDEFCOMP DNACCINT DREALE 
 
DLNFEE DDTL 
 
DHEPS DEPSt+1 DEVIBES 
DOTHERCF 0.103            
DLLP -0.011 -0.092           
DOPEB -0.075 -0.268 -0.114          
DDEFCOMP 0.065 -0.023 -0.013 -0.042         
DNACCINT -0.017 -0.004 -0.026 -0.015 -0.018        
DREALE 0.001 0.051 0.268 0.026 0.027 0.053       
DLNFEE 0.034 0.021 -0.014 0.006 0.199 0.113 0.009      
DDTL 0.053 -0.187 0.315 -0.198 0.016 -0.002 0.064 -0.002     
DHEPS -0.175 -0.179 -0.012 -0.015 -0.086 -0.018 -0.143 -0.077 0.033    
DEPSt+1 -0.016 0.494 0.060 -0.225 0.020 -0.019 -0.055 -0.016 -0.016 -0.155   
DEVIBES 0.125 0.049 0.075 0.039 -0.011 0.001 0.091 0.052 0.058 -0.107 0.026  
 
DEVHIST -0.166 -0.334 -0.028 0.042 -0.090 -0.019 -0.136 -0.092 0.116 0.863 -0.310 -0.227 
             
 
 
  
 
 
Table 5 
Determinants of changes in the valuation allowance and tests for earnings management (non-money center banks) 
The table presents our OLS estimations of equation (3), including fixed event-year effects.  The explanatory 
variables represent changes in the components of DTAs (DCOMPONENTS), changes in management's assessment 
of the future realizability of DTAs (DFUT_REAL), negative and positive deviations from analyst forecasts 
(BELOW_IBES and ABOVE_IBES, respectively) and from average historical EPS (BELOW_HIST and 
ABOVE_HIST, respectively).  See Table 3 for variable definitions.  Influential observations are deleted. 
 
e+b+Df+Df+Df+
Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+a=D
å+
i
i1t321
87654321
EARNMGMTROA HROA DTL                 
LNFEEREALENACCINTDEFCOMPOPEBLLPOTHERCFNOLVA
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
             
INTERCEPT ? -0.021 -0.72  -0.038 -1.23  -0.056 -1.77* 
 
Proxies for changes  
in DTA components: 
DNOL + 0.356 6.65***  0.368 6.50***  0.375 6.74*** 
DOTHERCF + 0.195 2.69***  0.154 1.93**  0.122 1.58* 
DLLP ? 0.173 3.79***  0.204 4.10***  0.209 4.36*** 
DOPEB ? -0.048 -0.28  0.023 0.12  0.033 0.17 
DDEFCOMP ? 0.378 1.95*  0.222 1.07  0.299 1.47 
DNACCINT ? 0.188 0.77  0.285 1.06  0.284 1.10 
DREALE ? 0.201 0.89  0.487 1.98**  0.537 2.26** 
DLNFEE ? -0.282 -1.11  -0.003 -0.01  -0.029 -0.11 
 
Proxies for future  
realizability of DTAs: 
DDTL - -0.025 -0.72  -0.042 -1.20  -0.003 -0.09 
DHEPS - -0.048 -4.78***  -0.179 -8.46***  -0.181 -8.49*** 
DEPSt+1 - -0.004 -0.54  0.002 0.23  0.000 -0.01 
 
Proxies for earnings  
management incentives: 
BELOW_IBES + 0.544 3.14***      0.139 1.52* 
ABOVE_IBES + 0.598 0.89      1.449 2.03** 
BELOW_HIST +     0.059 4.08***  0.065 4.62*** 
ABOVE_HIST +     0.093 5.70***  0.095 5.57*** 
             
             
F-statistic  8.996***   9.971***   10.248***  
Adjusted R2  0.447   0.470   0.505  
N  179   183   182  
             
 
* (**) {***} Statistically significant at the 10% (5%) {1%} level using a one-tailed test (two-tailed test if the sign is 
not predicted).
  
 
 
Table 6 
Determinants of changes in the valuation allowance and tests for earnings management for non-money center 
banks, using alternative proxies for earnings management incentives 
The table presents our OLS estimations of equation (3), including fixed event-year effects.  The explanatory 
variables represent changes in the components of DTAs (DCOMPONENTS), changes in management's assessment 
of the future realizability of DTAs (DFUT_REAL), negative and positive deviations from analyst forecasts 
(BELOW_IBES and ABOVE_IBES, respectively) and from average historical EPS (BELOW_HIST and 
ABOVE_HIST, respectively).  See Table 3 for variable definitions.  Influential observations are deleted. 
 
e+b+Df+Df+Df+
Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+Dl+a=D
å+
i
i1t321
87654321
EARNMGMTROA HROA DTL                 
LNFEEREALENACCINTDEFCOMPOPEBLLPOTHERCFNOLVA
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
             
INTERCEPT ? -0.019 -0.70  -0.024 -0.87  -0.044 -1.69* 
 
Proxies for changes  
in DTA components: 
DNOL + 0.171 3.93***  0.202 4.54***  0.185 4.46*** 
DOTHERCF + 0.335 6.59***  0.324 6.45***  0.300 6.47*** 
DLLP ? 0.186 2.69***  0.220 2.89***  0.205 2.88*** 
DOPEB ? -0.044 -0.27  -0.081 -0.49  -0.081 -0.53 
DDEFCOMP ? 0.419 2.26**  0.146 0.81  0.256 1.51 
DNACCINT ? 0.135 0.58  0.266 1.14  0.185 0.86 
DREALE ? 0.162 0.75  0.266 1.20  0.156 0.77 
DLNFEE ? -0.287 -1.18  -0.155 -0.64  -0.133 -0.59 
 
Proxies for future  
realizability of DTAs: 
DDTL - -0.021 -0.66  -0.039 -1.26  -0.054 -1.87** 
DHEPS - -0.043 -4.54***  -0.124 -7.12***  -0.107 -6.27*** 
DEPSt+1 - -0.003 -0.50  -0.000 -0.14  -0.001 -0.16 
 
Proxies for earnings  
management incentives: 
A_BELOW_IBES + 0.872 5.15***      0.632 3.85*** 
ABOVE_IBES + 0.527 0.82      3.886 7.77*** 
A_BELOW_HIST +     0.268 2.81***  0.574 6.14*** 
ABOVE_HIST +     0.059 4.08***  0.050 3.54*** 
             
             
F-statistic  10.649   10.001   14.884  
Adjusted R2  0.493   0.477   0.612  
N  179   178   177  
             
 
* (**) {***} Statistically significant at the 10% (5%) {1%} level using a one-tailed test (two-tailed test if the sign is 
not predicted). 
